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1 Introduction
Motivated by high pro…le auctions such as the FCC or the Treasury bill auctions, theoretical research has
recently been extended from single to multi-unit auctions. Friedman (1960) proposed to change the rules
of the Treasury bill auctions from a discriminatory to a uniform–price format which was thought by some
authors to be a generalization of the incentive compatible Vickrey auction to the multi-unit case. Vickrey
(1961), however, has already indicated that this is not the case. In the uniform–price auction any bidder
has an incentive to reduce demand on all except for the …rst unit, since one of his bids may determine
the price he has to pay for inframarginal units. A formal proof was provided more recently by Ausubel
and Cramton (2002) who, moreover, showed that in many cases the discriminatory auction outperforms
the uniform-price auction. Similarly, Katzmann (1995), Noussair (1995), Engelbrecht–Wiggans and Kahn
(1998), and Grimm et al. (2003) analyze auctions where bidders have demand for multiple units and give
examples of equilibria that involve demand reduction.
A sealed–bid mechanism that generalizes the Vickrey auction for single units to the multi-unit case
has already been presented in Vickrey (1961). It is basically a special case of the revelation mechanisms
developed independently by Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973). Ausubel (2004) proposed an open auction
that implements the outcome of the (incentive compatible) multi–unit Vickrey auction in a way that is
possibly most transparent to bidders.
In this paper we experimentally investigate bidding behavior in …ve di¤erent multi–unit auction formats:
the discriminatory auction (DA), the uniform–price sealed–bid auction (UPS), the uniform–price open
auction (UPO), the Vickrey Auction (VA), and the Ausubel Auction (AA). Our experiment consists of a
series of two-unit, two bidder auctions. Bidders have a ‡at demand for two units. In this framework, in the
most extreme case, demand reduction in equilibrium involves a zero bid on the second unit in the uniform–
price auctions. This implies a maximum di¤erence between the theoretical prediction for the uniform–price
auction and the other auction formats in terms of revenue.
We …nd that demand reduction is more frequent in UPO than in UPS, but, interestingly, does also
occur in AA. As a consequence e¢ciency is substantially lower in UPO than in the other auctions. Demand
reduction decreases substantially in AA over time and as a consequence, e¢ciency in AA is signi…cantly
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higher than in DA, UPO, and UPS in the second half of the experiment. Revenue equivalence for the two
uniform–price auctions and for the non–uniform–price auctions, respectively, does not hold. In contrast to
the theoretical prediction, revenues depend less on the pricing rule than on whether the auction is open
or sealed–bid and they are higher in the latter case. On the one hand, this is due to the di¤erent extent
of demand reduction in open and sealed-bid auctions. On the other hand, …rst, bidders more frequently
overbid their valuation in VA and UPS where it is less clear that overbidding is dominated than in the more
transparent open auctions. Second, in DA average bids frequently are above the equilibrium prediction. In
clear contrast to the theoretical prediction, in DA bidders place substantially di¤erent bids on the …rst and
the second unit, which might be caused be a myopic zero-pro…t aversion of the bidders.
In the uniform–price treatments bidders played both, UPO and UPS. Here we found that even pairs
that in UPO coordinated on the payo¤-dominant equilibrium involving complete demand reduction, only
rarely managed to do so in the subsequent UPS. We observe, however, some tendency towards the payo¤
dominant equilibrium.
Closely related experiments were run by Alsemgeest et al. (1998), Kagel and Levin (2001), List and
Lucking–Reiley (2000), and Porter and Vragov (2000). Our experiments are, however, the …rst to compare
all these …ve standard auction formats in the same framework. Alsemgeest et al. (1998) compare UPO
and a version of UPS (with a di¤erent pricing rule). They …nd that the revenue is higher in the sealed
bid auction and that bidders reduce demand in UPO. Kagel and Levin compare uniform–price sealed–bid
and open auctions and the Ausubel auction and …nd systematic demand reduction in the uniform–price
auctions. Their subjects also have ‡at demand for two units but bid against robot bidders with unit
demand. List and Lucking–Reiley conduct …eld experiments, comparing the uniform–price sealed–bid
and the Vickrey sealed–bid auction by selling sportscards in two–unit, two–person auctions. They also …nd
demand reduction in uniform–price auctions, compared to Vickrey auctions. They cannot, however, control
for the bidders’ valuations. Their experiment is replicated in the laboratory by Porter and Vragov (2000),
who …nd substantial deviations from demand revelation in both, UPS and VA, but also more demand
reduction in UPS.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the equilibria of our auction games and the
implied hypotheses. The experimental design is presented in section 3, followed by the experimental results
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in section 4, and the conclusions. In the appendix we present in more detail an analysis of equilibria of the
uniform–price auctions and show that there is a continuum of equilibria both in UPS and UPO, but that
even under incomplete information the demand reduction equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of UPO
that satis…es certain re…nements.
2 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
2.1 Equilibrium Analysis
We investigate bidding behavior in independent private value auctions with two bidders and two indivisible
identical objects for sale. Each bidder demands at most two units. A bidder places the same value vi on
each unit. The bidders’ valuations are drawn independently from the same uniform distribution on the
interval [0; V ].
We consider …ve di¤erent auction formats. In the three sealed–bid auctions the bidders simultaneously
submit sealed–bids for each of the units demanded and prices and allocations are determined according
to the auction rules. The two open auctions start out with a price of zero and active bids on all units
demanded. The price is increased and units are traded according to the rules of the mechanism as bidders
drop out. In all auctions the two highest bids each win a unit.
Uniform–Price Sealed–Bid Auction [UPS] and Uniform–Price Open Auction [UPO]
In the uniform–price auctions the price for all units equals the highest rejected bid. In our experiment,
this is the third highest bid. In the uniform–price sealed–bid auction, each bidder places two bids and
the units are allocated to the two highest bids (or randomly in case of a tie). The uniform-price open
auction starts out with a price of zero, with the price increasing continuously thereafter. Bidders start out
actively bidding on two units each and may choose the price(s) where they drop out on one unit, or on
both. Dropping out is irrevocable so that a bidder can no longer bid on a unit he has dropped out on. As
soon as the number of active bids equals the number of units available, both items are sold to the bidder(s)
holding the active bids at the price at which the last bidder dropped out. Thus, the price is determined
either by a second dropout of a bidder on one unit or by a bidder’s simultaneous dropout on both units.
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In both uniform–price formats it is a weakly dominant strategy to bid one’s valuation vi on the …rst
unit1 (i. e. the higher bid always equals the true valuation). A bid on the …rst unit will only determine
the price if it is the highest rejected bid, i. e. if the bidder does not get a unit. Therefore, lowering the bid
implies the risk of missing a pro…table deal whereas overbidding might result in buying a unit at a loss.
This is even more obvious in the open auction. If bidder i has already dropped out on one unit, dropping
out on the other unit before his valuation vi is reached guarantees a pro…t of 0, whereas continuing might
yield a positive pro…t, if the other bidder drops before vi is reached. Staying in at prices above vi causes a
loss as soon as the other bidder drops out.
Lowering the bid on the second unit, however, presents a trade-o¤. A lower bid on the second unit lowers
the chance of winning two units but, at the same time, may reduce the price paid for the …rst unit. As it
turns out, the uniform-price auctions have multiple equilibria. All equilibria that do not involve truthful
bidding on the …rst unit are weakly dominated. Among those equilibria that involve truthful bidding on
the …rst unit the following are the extreme cases: Truthful revelation on both units,
b1(vi) = b2(vi) = vi; (1)
(where b1 denotes the …rst unit bid and b2 the second unit bid) and full demand reduction on the second
unit such that the bid on the second unit is zero,
b1(vi) = vi; (2)
b2(vi) = 0:
In the following we will refer to these equilibria as the truth–telling (TT) and the demand reduction (DR)
equilibrium, respectively.
The remaining equilibria in undominated strategies are of the following form: Let K be an integer ¸ 1;
xK+1 = V and [xk; yk), k = 1; : : :K be a sequence of non–overlapping intervals with x1 ¸ 0, xk < yk, and
yk · xk+1. Then, the equilibrium strategies are:
1 “First unit” (“second unit”) always refers to the unit on which the bidder places the higher (lower) bid.
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b1(vi) = vi (3)
b2(vi) =
8<: xk if vi 2 [xk; yk);vi otherwise.
This implies that a bidder bids truthfully if his valuation lies in a truth–telling interval [yk; xk+1) and
partially reduces demand if his valuation lies in a demand reduction interval [xk; yk).2
For the sealed–bid auction we show in appendix A.1 that it is not pro…table to deviate from this strategy
given the other bidder plays it. For the open auction, the strategy is sequentially rational if beliefs have
the following form (i. e. together they constitute a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium, wPBE, according to
the de…nition of Mas-Colell et al., 1995):3
(a) As long as the other bidder does not drop out on any unit bidder i believes that the other bidder’s
valuation is uniformly distributed on the interval of valuations for which equilibrium behavior does
not prescribe dropping out at a lower price. Hence, if the current price p is in the interior of a demand
reduction interval (xk; yk), then the belief is uniformly distributed on [yk; V ] (because equilibrium
behavior prescribes for all valuations in [xk; yk) to drop out at xk) and otherwise the belief is uniformly
distributed on [p; V ].
(b) If the other bidder drops out on one unit at zk 2 [xk; yk) bidder i believes that the other bidder’s
valuation is uniformly distributed4 in the interval [p; yk) for any current price p 2 [zk; yk),
(c) If the other bidder drops out on one unit at zk 2 [yk; xk+1) bidder i believes that the other bidder’s
valuation is uniformly distributed in the interval [p;minfxk+1; vig) for any current price p 2 [zk; xk+1),
2 Note that if yK = V then the Kth interval can also be closed. Furthermore, equilibria can be constructed in the same
way with left open instead of right open intervals.
3 In particular bidders stick to their equilibrium bids even if the other bidder deviated from the equilibrium path. See also
appendix A.2 for a detailed analysis.
4 The uniform distribution is only one example that implies that the suggested equilibrium strategy is indeed a best response.
For example, in this case, any symmetric distribution would work. A non-uniform distribution would, however, require an
unintuitive updating process.
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(d) If the other bidder has already dropped out on one unit in an interval but has not dropped out on the
other unit in the same interval, then bidder i believes that the other bidder’s valuation is uniformly
distributed in [p; yl) if p 2 [xl; yl) and in [p;minfxl+1; vig) if p 2 [yl; xl+1), p being the current price.
It seems, however, highly unlikely that bidders can coordinate on one of these more sophisticated
equilibria. There is no particular incentive to do so and they are more di¢cult to determine than the TT–
and the DR–equilibrium. Note that the latter are extreme cases in the sense that DR requires K = 1,
x1 = 0, and y1 = V and TT results for K = 0.
Note that any equilibrium that involves bidding truthfully on the second unit requires type dependent
beliefs. While Mas-Colell et al. (1995) do not explicitly rule out type dependent beliefs in their de…ni-
tion of wPBE,5 Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) do so in their de…nition of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
(PBE).6 Type-dependent beliefs do not appear plausible, because this assumes that the beliefs of one player
concerning another player depend on a random event (namely that which determines his own valuation).
They are also inconsistent with the “no signalling what you do not know” condition (Fudenberg and Tirole,
1991, p. 332), because an action of player B would signal something to player A about player A’s valuation
(since B’s action would, according to A’s belief, di¤er with A’s valuation), which B does not know. Type
dependent beliefs are de…nitely precluded in a Sequential Equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982), because
the beliefs are derived as a limit of beliefs resulting from completely mixed strategies of the players.
If type dependent beliefs are not permitted, the only remaining equilibria are those that involve only
DR–intervals (but arbitrarily many). By a sequence of in…nitesimally small DR–intervals, however, a TT–
interval can be approximated. In particular, in our experiment, where valuations are restricted to integers
in [0,100], a sequence of m DR–intervals of length 1 induces the same behavior as a TT–interval of length
m (but the beliefs supporting these equilibria are di¤erent).
Uniqueness of the DR–equilibrium results if we require that a sequential equilibrium satis…es support
restriction (Madrigal et al., 1987). The latter amounts to requiring that a player does not assign positive
5 Their criterion for a wPBE to be a PBE does not rule out such beliefs either.
6 The lack of a generally accepted de…nition of a PBE precludes a de…nite answer as to whether type dependent beliefs are
admissible.
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probability to another player’s type if he has assigned probability 0 to this type before (see appendix A.4).7
Furthermore, the DR–equilibrium is the only Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the open auction if the
beliefs strictly follow Bayes’ rule also o¤ the equilibrium path (that is, if a bidder observes a dropout he
infers only that the opponent’s valuation is higher than the dropout price and updates the initial distribution
accordingly). In particular, such beliefs imply that whenever one bidder drops out on one unit, the other
immediately follows (see appendix A.4).
All other equilibria of the open auction require that the bidders believe they are able to infer information
from the other bidder’s actions (o¤ the equilibrium path) exceeding the minimal requirement that bidders
only play undominated strategies. Intuitively, such equilibria may not seem completely implausible: If, for
example K = 1, x1 = 0, and y1 = V=2, equilibrium beliefs would be that only bidders with low valuations
drop out early, whereas bidders with high valuations always behave rather competitively. However, to
make truthful bidding above V=2 an equilibrium strategy, a bidder’s beliefs have to depend on his own type
(i. e. valuation), as in (c) and (d) above.
We show in appendix A.3 that among all equilibria of the uniform–price auction the DR–equilibrium
yields the highest expected payo¤ to the bidders.
Discriminatory Auction [DA]
In the discriminatory auction, the two highest bids win a unit each and the respective prices equal these
bids.
An important observation in order to derive the optimal strategy is that with ‡at demand a bidder
places the same bid on both units.8 Suppose the other bidder placed two di¤erent bids. Then, in order to
win one unit a bidder has to overbid only the other bidder’s lower bid and in order to get two units both
his bids have to exceed the other bidder’s higher bid. Therefore, a bid on the …rst unit solves the optimal
7 In our design, however, where valuations are restricted to integers (and hence, as argued above, TT–intervals can be
constructed through a sequence of DR–intervals of length 1 without requiring type dependent beliefs), support restriction only
precludes DR–intervals of length 2 or larger that do not include V . Hence sequential equilibria satisfying support restriction
are of the form implying truth–telling up to some valuation v¤ and one DR–interval [v¤; V ].
8 See Lebrun and Tremblay (2000) for a formal proof of this fact for much more general demand functions.
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trade-o¤ between the probability of winning (against the other bidder’s lower bid) and pro…t in this case.
Now observe that the probability of winning the second unit is even lower (one has to overbid the other
bidder’s higher bid) and therefore, the optimal trade-o¤ for the second unit cannot be solved at a lower
bid. Thus, both bids will be equal since by de…nition the bid for the second unit cannot be higher than the
bid for the …rst unit. If the other bidder chooses identical bids, the argument is even more obvious, since
the trade-o¤ is the same for both units.
Thus, the equilibrium bid function on each unit solves
max
b
F (¾(b))[vi ¡ b]; (4)
where ¾(b) is the inverse of the equilibrium strategy b?(v). In the case of uniformly distributed valuations
on [0; V ] and two bidders the equilibrium bid functions are
b1(vi) = b2(vi) =
1
2
vi: (5)
Vickrey Auction [VA]
In the multi unit generalization of the Vickrey auction the total price a bidder pays for the units he obtains
equals the sum of the bids (other than his own) that are displaced by his successful bids. In our framework
this means that, if one bidder places the two highest bids, he pays the two bids of the other bidder. If each
bidder places one of the two highest bids, each pays the lower bid of the other bidder because his higher
bid displaces the lower bid of the other bidder.
Thus, a bidder cannot in‡uence the price he pays for any unit he obtains by changing his bids. Changing
an unsuccessful bid has no e¤ect unless it displaces another bid. In that case one obtains another unit and
pays the displaced bid. This, of course, increases pro…ts if and only if the displaced bid is lower than the
bidder’s own valuation vi. Thus it is clearly weakly dominated to bid below vi. But bidding above vi on
any unit is also dominated, since one might displace a bid that is also higher than vi and hence incur a
loss. Therefore, each bidder has the weakly dominant strategy of bidding truthfully on both units. (For
the general case see also Vickrey, 1961.)
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Ausubel Auction [AA]
The Ausubel (or dynamic Vickrey) auction (Ausubel, 2004) is an open mechanism that implements the
same outcome as the multi-unit Vickrey auction in a way that has a great potential for transparency to
bidders. The auction starts out at a price of zero which is then increased continuously. In the general case,
at any price it is checked for each bidder whether the aggregate demand of the other bidders is smaller
than the available number of units. If this is the case, he receives the available units at the current price.
In our case, the price is raised until one bidder (say, bidder i) drops out on one unit. At this point
bidder j gets one unit for sure (in other words: he has “clinched” one unit). This unit is traded immediately
and bidder j pays the price at which he has clinched it. Then the auction continues at this price for the
remaining item that is still unsold. From that point on the two bidders are involved in a single-object
English clock auction.
Under these rules the bidders have an incentive for full demand revelation on both units since the price
paid for the …rst unit does not a¤ect the price paid for the other unit. Thus,
b1(vi) = b2(vi) = vi: (6)
This equilibrium is obtained by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. If one bidder has
already dropped out it is weakly dominated to drop out at a price other than vi, since the dropout price
only determines the price for the remaining unit. One can only lose by staying in above vi and can miss
a possible gain by dropping out before vi is reached. Eliminating these strategies then implies that the
price of the …rst dropout does not in‡uence the result of the subsequent bidding process. Hence it is also
weakly dominated to drop out …rst at a price other than vi since this dropout price only determines the
price for this unit. To make not dropping out at a price lower than vi optimal, however, requires knowing
that the other bidder will not play a dominated strategy (e.g. will not drop out immediately after). Hence
the equilibrium is not in weakly dominant strategies, but the game is only dominant solvable. The solution
concept is thus weaker than in VA. In contrast the mechanism appears to be more transparent, which might
compensate, in terms of e¢ciency, for the weaker equilibrium concept (see also Kagel et al., 2003).
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2.2 Hypotheses Derived from the Theory
The theoretical analysis gives us several hypotheses to test.
(1) First unit bids in UPO, UPS, AA, and VA should equal the valuation (see the results in section 4.1).
(2) We have an equilibrium selection problem in the uniform-price auctions. These auctions have several
equilibria, one of which (the DR–equilibrium) payo¤ dominates the others from the bidders’ viewpoint.
The DR–equilibrium involves a zero bid on the second unit. Based on the payo¤-dominance of the
DR-equilibrium we expect to observe demand reduction on the second unit in UPO and UPS at
least in some of the pairs. Furthermore, we hypothesize that the DR–equilibrium is chosen more
frequently in UPO than in UPS, since, as we argued above, it is the only equilibrium of UPO that
satis…es certain re…nements.9 In addition, in UPO one bidder can initiate it by dropping out on one
unit immediately (see section 4.2).
(3) In all three auction formats AA, VA, and DA, the bid on the …rst unit should equal the bid on the
second unit. (see section 4.3).
(4) In equilibrium, all units should be allocated e¢ciently in VA, AA, and DA. In contrast, only half of
the units should be allocated e¢ciently if the DR–equilibrium is played in UPO and UPS, or more
generally, not all units should be allocated e¢ciently if hypothesis (2) holds (see section 4.4).
(5) If hypotheses (2) holds and strategies involving demand reduction are played at least in some cases
in UPO and UPS, revenues are expected to be signi…cantly lower in the uniform–price auctions than
in the other three auctions. Revenues in AA, VA, and DA are theoretically equivalent in our setting
(see section 4.5).10
(6) The bidders’ expected payo¤s are equal in AA, VA, and DA. If hypothesis (2) is correct, they are
higher in the uniform price auctions and higher in UPO than in UPS (see section 4.6).
9 See also appendix A.4.
10 In DA, the price for each unit is 12 maxfvi; vjg and E[maxfvi; vjg] = 23V . In AA and VA the price is minfvi; vjg and
E[minfvi; vjg] = 13V , so that the expected revenue is 23V in both cases. In contrast, the expected revenue in the uniform-price
auctions is between 0 (if the DR–equilibrium is played) and 23V (if TT is played).
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(7) There might be some learning spillover between the two sequentially played uniform price auctions
formats, which gives rise to the following hypothesis: Bidders select the DR-equilibrium more often
in UPS if they have played UPO before, i. e. they manage to transfer the DR they may learn in UPO
at least partly to UPS (see section 4.7).
3 Experimental Design
In each auction two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned o¤ among two bidders with ‡at demand
for two units. Choosing to auction o¤ two units per auction yields a simple payo¤-dominant equilibrium in
the case of uniform–price auctions, as described above. This creates the most signi…cant di¤erence between
equilibrium bidding in the uniform–price auctions and the discriminatory, Vickrey, and Ausubel auctions.
In each auction the bidders’ private valuations for both units were drawn independently from the same
uniform distribution on [0; 100].11 The bidders were undergraduate students from Humboldt University
Berlin, the University of Zürich, and the ETH Zürich. Pairs of bidders were randomly formed. In DA, VA
and AA each pair played ten auctions under the same rules. In the uniform–price auctions, in treatment
UPOS each pair …rst played ten open auctions and then ten sealed–bid, in treatment UPSO vice versa.12
Apart from this, in each session only one type of auction was conducted. For each treatment we had ten
pairs, except for treatment DA, where we had nine.
The rationale for the …xed matching we employed was twofold. First, there are obvious practical con-
siderations, namely generating a relatively large number of independent observations for each of our …ve
treatments with limited …nancial and subject pool resources. Second, we believe this to be a tougher test
than random matching for the expected theoretical e¢ciency superiority of AA, VA, and DA. On the one
hand, potential collusion due to repeated interaction would work to the disadvantage of the e¢cient auc-
tions. On the other hand, in the uniform price auctions, where demand reduction can occur in equilibrium
11 Valuations were in fact drawn from the set of integers in [0,100] and also bids were restricted to integers. As argued above,
this a¤ects the equilibria in UPO. It does not, however, in‡uence the predictions in the other treatments.
12 This is why we only played ten auctions per pair and auction type. We wanted the total number of periods not to exceed
20 to avoid subjects getting bored. We also wanted to keep the incentives in each auction relatively high with a limited budget.
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and where bidders might well understand this once they have experienced it, with random matching there
might be learning spillovers from one bidder to the others. Hence we could expect more demand reduction
and less collusion and hence larger e¢ciency di¤erences with random matching than with …xed matching.
In addition, for many applications, …xed matching appears to be the more realistic model and it is hence in-
teresting to study the susceptibility of the di¤erent auction formats to collusion under repeated interaction.
See also the discussion in section 4.4.
Subjects were placed at isolated computer terminals, so that they could not determine whom they
formed a pair with. Then the instructions (see appendix B for a translated sample) were read aloud.
Before the start of a sequence of ten auctions, subjects played three dry runs, where they knew that their
partner was simulated by a pre-programmed strategy. These strategies and the valuations of the subjects
in the three dry runs were chosen in such a way that it was likely that each subject was exposed to winning
0 units in one auction, 1 unit in another and 2 units in the third. The pre-programmed strategies did not
re‡ect any characteristics of the equilibria (in particular complete demand reduction in the uniform–price
auctions) and the subjects were explicitly advised that they should not see these strategies as examples of
a good or a bad strategy (because they only observed the bids, they could not really copy the programmed
strategy in any case). In the uniform–price sessions subjects were informed that after the …rst ten auctions,
ten further auctions under a di¤erent rule would be conducted, without further details being given at that
point. After all pairs had …nished the …rst ten auctions, the instructions for the second part were again
read aloud.
In the open auction formats the price stayed at 0 for four seconds and then increased at a rate of 1 per
second. Bidders could drop out on one or both (if no bidder had dropped out before) units at any time.
After one bidder dropped out on one unit and the other bidder was informed about this, the price stayed
at the dropout level for four seconds and increased at a rate of 1 per second thereafter. If a bidder dropped
out during these four seconds, the dropout is regarded as at the same price but later than the …rst dropout.
At any time during the bidding process, the bidders could observe the current price, the number of items
for sale and the number of active bids. If there were more than two active bids when the price rose above
the maximum price of 100, then in UPO both bidders received one unit for a price of 100. In AA both
13
bidders received one unit for a price of 100 if both still had two active bids, while the remaining unit was
randomly allocated if one bidder had dropped out on one unit before. The sealed–bid auctions were run in
a straightforward way, i. e. both bidders simultaneously placed two bids. Subjects were informed that the
order of the bids was irrelevant.
After each auction bidders were informed about the observed dropout prices in the open auctions, or
all four bids in the sealed–bid auctions, as well as the resulting allocation, their own gains or losses and
their aggregate pro…ts.
The experimental software was developed in zTree (Fischbacher, 1999). The sessions lasted for about
60 to 80 minutes in the uniform–price auctions and for about 30 to 50 minutes in the other treatments. At
the end of each session, experimental currency units were exchanged in real currency at a rate of DM 0.04
(Berlin) or CHF 0.04 (Zürich) per ECU. In addition subjects received DM 5 (Berlin) or CHF10 (Zürich) as
show-up fee.13 Average total payo¤s were 342 ECU in AA, 270 ECU in DA, 290 ECU in VA, 350 ECU in
UPO, 351 in UPoS (amounting to an average total payo¤ in UPOS of 701 ECU), 312 ECU in UPS, and 351
in UPsO (amounting to an average total payo¤ in UPSO of 663 ECU). This resulted in average earnings
(including show-up fees) of DM 25.23 (about EURO 12.90) in Berlin and CHF 27.29 (about EURO 17.75)
in Zuerich.
4 Experimental Results
As stated above, in treatments UPOS and UPSO the subjects played both uniform–price auctions in
sequence. For the general comparison of all …ve auctions we only consider the …rst set of auctions out
of these sessions (denoted by UPO and UPS) since the behavior in the second set of auctions is not
independent of the behavior in the …rst one. We analyze behavior in the second set of auctions (denoted
by UPsO and UPoS) separately in subsection 4.7, looking in particular at whether bidders move closer to
the DR–equilibrium in the sealed–bid auction if they played the open version …rst.
13 In order to relate the earnings, the exchange rates are 1 CHF = 0.65 Euro and 1 DM = 0.51 Euro. Cost of living is higher
in Zurich, which justi…ed the higher returns. The higher show-up fee in Zurich is based on a longer average commute to the
laboratory than in Berlin.
14
The scatter diagrams in …gures 1.1 through 2.4 provide a …rst impression of the behavior of the bidders
in the …ve di¤erent auctions. Figure 1.1. through 1.6 show the bids in the three di¤erent sealed–bid
auctions, where “unit1 bids” refers to the (weakly) higher, and “unit2 bids” to the (weakly) lower bid
of a bidder. Figures 2.1 through 2.4 show dropout prices in the open auctions, AA and UPO. “Double
dropouts” are simultaneous dropouts of one bidder on both units. “First dropouts” are the …rst dropout of
a bidder on a unit while “second dropouts” refer to the second dropout in one auction, i. e. the price where
the auction ends, not necessarily to the second dropout of one bidder. While …gures 2.1 and 2.3 depict
the overall behavior, 2.2 and 2.4 depict the behavior of pairs that almost followed equilibrium behavior. In
what follows we will refer to these …gures in order to illustrate the results.
Below, we generally use non-parametric Mann–Whitney tests for comparisons between treatments.
These are always based on aggregate data per pair. The aggregate is computed over all periods unless
explicitly behavior in only the second …ve of the ten auctions is compared. For comparisons within a
treatment (between the …rst …ve and the second …ve auctions or between the …rst and the second set of
auctions in UPOS and UPSO), as well as for comparisons with equilibrium predictions, we generally use
non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, because the data are paired. Again the tests are based on
aggregate data per pair.
4.1 Are First-Unit Bids Truthful in VA, UPO, UPS, and AA?
Result 1 (First Unit Bids) In AA, UPO, and VA, …rst-unit bids generally resemble truthful bidding. In
UPS, overbidding is frequent and substantial.
In AA most of the observed …rst unit bids were truthful except for one pair where one of the bidders
tried to cooperate by dropping out on both units immediately and then expecting the other bidder to do
the same in the next round (see the double dropouts at 0 in Figure 2.1). Of 83 observable …rst-unit bids,
53% were exactly equal to the valuation and another 18% just one ECU above or below. Overbidding
was very rare (9 bids exceeded the valuation by more than 1 ECU), probably because it is easy to see for
bidders that this is dominated.
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In UPO we only have few cases where we can observe both bids (56 out of 200 possible cases). If the
bidders play close to the DR–equilibrium, they both drop out immediately and thus, we do not know what
they would have bid on the …rst unit. However, 30.4% of observable …rst unit bids were exactly equal to the
valuation and an additional 21.4% were one ECU above or below. According to Wilcoxon signed-rank tests
(for the hypothesis that …rst-unit bids relative to valuations equal 1), relative underbidding on the …rst
unit (where the …rst unit bids are observable) was not signi…cantly di¤erent from 0 in AA (p = 0:76), but
was signi…cant in UPO (p = 0:012). In particular, a Mann-Whitney test reveals that relative underbidding
was signi…cantly larger in UPO than in AA (p = 0:016). Overbidding occurred even less in UPO than in
AA.
In VA a high fraction of …rst unit bids was at the valuation (29.5% of bids were exactly equal to the
valuation and an additional 10.5% were one ECU above or below), as can be seen in Figure 1.3. The
average bid on the …rst unit exceeded the valuation by only 0.78 (p = 0:3329; Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
In UPS bidders frequently over- or underbid their valuations on the …rst unit. Overbidding is substantial
(33.5 % of …rst unit bids where above the valuation), as can also be seen in Figure 1.1. Bidders bid truthfully
on the …rst unit in about a third of the cases (19.5% of bids were exactly equal to the valuation and an
additional 10% were one ECU above or below). Average overbidding on the …rst unit (5.55) just fails to be
signi…cant (p = 0:114; Wilcoxon signed-rank test). Overbidding even increased (insigni…cantly) over time.
One subject in UPS bid his valuation on the …rst unit in all auctions.
Two additional observations in UPS might be interesting in this context: First, out of 67 instances
where bidders overbid on at least the …rst unit, only 11 led to a loss for the bidder. This illustrates quite
well that bidders in UPS hardly learn that overbidding is dominated. Moreover — quite surprisingly —
only in one case a bidder revised his behavior after su¤ering a loss.
4.2 Demand Reduction in UPO/UPS
Result 2 (Demand Reduction) Complete demand reduction occurs frequently in UPO, but only rarely
in UPS.
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Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show dropout prices in UPO.14 Figure 2.4 shows that in three pairs both bidders
almost always dropped out on one unit at price 0, independently of their valuation.15 These three pairs
almost played the (DR–) equilibrium strategy, while the other pairs either bid roughly consistent with
the TT–equilibrium or did not seem to have found a reasonable strategy. Figure 2.3 depicts the overall
behavior. One can also observe whether bidders play according to the requirement of the DR–equilibrium
to drop out on one unit immediately once the other bidder has dropped out, which was violated in 55 % of
the observable cases.
Figures 1.2 shows the (weakly) lower bids in UPS (“unit2 bids”). As expected we observe substantially
fewer cases of complete demand reduction. In particular, we observed only 9 zero–bids on the second
unit (from bidders with positive valuations) in UPS, which were all placed by the same subject, while we
observed 33 such bids in UPO (notably, in UPO, the number of zero bids increases from 12 in periods
1 to 5 to 21 in periods 6 to 10).16 The number of zero–bids is signi…cantly higher in UPO than in UPS
(Mann–Whitney test, p = 0:085). In UPS, only one subject consistently chose the TT–equilibrium strategy,
which was, however, not part of an equilibrium either, since the other subject was underbidding on the
second unit most of the time.
4.3 Equality of Bids and Bid Spreads
According to the equilibrium prediction, in AA, VA, and DA the bidders should place equal bids on both
units. In this section, we study the deviation from this prediction and also compare it to the bid spreading
in UPS, where this is consistent with equilibrium behavior.
Result 3 (Bid Spreading) (i) Bid spreads are small in AA and VA.
14 Recall that “second dropouts” refer to the second dropout in one auction, that is, the price where the auction ends, not
necessarily to the second dropout of one bidder.
15 Note that for the open auctions we can only include the observed bids in the Figures. For the unobserved bids, a lower
threshold is given by the price at which the auction ended. Hence, the …gures for the open auctions should not be directly
compared to those for the sealed–bid auctions, because the latter show all bids, whereas the former show only the two lowest
bids in each auction.
16 In addition, there were 15 bids equal to 1 (by bidders with valuations larger than 1) in UPO, but only 4 in UPS.
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maxbid-minbid UPO UPS AA VA DA
= 0 27%¤ 18% 64%¤ 49% 12%
< 10% Equ. 43%¤ 34% 68%¤ 62% 15%
¸ 40% Equ. 32%¤ 33% 18%¤ 14% 49%
Table 1: Share of bid pairs (*: of observable bid pairs) that are exactly equal, where the di¤erence is smaller
than 10, or larger than 40 percent.
(ii) In sharp contrast, they are substantial and persistent in DA, and of similar magnitude in UPS.
AA Five pairs played almost exactly according to the equilibrium prediction, i. e. double dropouts at the
valuation (see Figure 2.2). In some pairs bidders tried to cooperate by bidding 0 on both units if their
valuation was relatively low (see the double dropouts at zero in Figure 2.1), or by using strategies that
resembled the DR–equilibrium strategies in a uniform–price auction. Overall we observed 26 extremely low
(0 or 1) bids on the second unit, which is substantially (but not signi…cantly) lower than in UPO (48), but
higher than in UPS (13) and VA (6). These attempts to cooperate were in general not successful (or, in
one case successful for only three periods) and were abandoned after some auctions. As a consequence, the
number of very low bids drops from 17 in periods 1 to 5 to 9 in periods 6 to 10 (while in UPO this number
increases from 19 to 29).
In about half of the cases we can observe (or infer lower or upper bounds for) the di¤erence between
maximal and minimal bids in AA. In 64% of decidable cases the bids were exactly equal, in 68% the
di¤erence was smaller than 10% of the equilibrium bid (i. e. the valuation) and in only 18% of the cases
the di¤erence was greater than or equal to 40% of the valuation (see Table 1). Most unobservable cases are
those where the other bidder dropped out on two units, hence there is no indication that the undecidable
cases correspond to large bid spreads. Rather the contrary is true, because not dropping out on one unit
up to this price reduces the maximal possible bid spread of the remaining bidder.
VA Though only two out of ten pairs were very close to the equilibrium in VA, eight subjects played
close to the weakly dominant strategy to place bids equal to the valuation for both units. 2 subjects bid
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exactly the valuation on both units in all auctions. The …rst and second unit bids are shown in Figures 1.3
and 1.4, respectively.
Similarly to AA, in VA most of the bid di¤erences (62%) were smaller than 10% of the equilibrium bid
(i. e. the valuation), with 49% of bid pairs being exactly equal. In only 14% of cases the di¤erence exceeded
40% of the valuation. The bid di¤erences were thus substantially smaller than in DA and UPS (see Table
1). The aggregate bid spread (sum of bid di¤erences divided by sum of equilibrium bids over all pairs and
periods) is 13%. Analyzing the data for the individual bidders, according to a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test,
the hypothesis that both, the higher and the lower bid (relative to equilibrium bids) are drawn from the
same distribution can be rejected at the 5%-level for only 4 bidders. Equal bids in all 10 auctions were
placed by 4 (out of 20) bidders. A linear regression of the bidspread yields, over all subjects and periods
(with robust standard errors taking the dependence within a pair into account) a signi…cantly (p = 0:057)
negative coe¢cient (¡0:87) for the variable “period”. Hence the bid spreading in VA clearly decreased
over time. In fact, the aggregate bid spread is 17% in periods 1 to 5 and 8% in periods 6 to 10. Moreover,
the aggregate bid spread decreases from the …rst to the second half of the experiment in nine pairs, but
increases in only one (the decrease is signi…cant,Wilcoxon signed-rank test p = 0:028).
Estimating bid functions that are linear in the valuation yields over all subjects very similar results
in regressions of the higher (coe¢cient for valuation 0.859, constant 7.74) and the lower (coe¢cient for
valuation 0.826, constant 3.09) bid.17
DA In DA bidders rarely choose equal bids. In only 12% of cases the bids were exactly equal and in
only 15% (including the 12% equal bids) the di¤erence was smaller than 10% of the equilibrium bid (i.
e. 5% of the valuation, see Table 1). About half of these nearly equal bids were submitted by only two
subjects. 49% of the bid spreads were larger than or equal to 40% of the equilibrium bid. The aggregate
bid spread is 37%. Thus, bid spreads were of comparable magnitude as in UPS, where bid spreading is
implied by demand reduction. The bid spreading is also vividly illustrated by comparing Figures 1.5 and
1.6. As shown by Figure 1.5, the majority of the …rst unit (i. e. higher) bids lies between the valuation
17 We also estimated bid functions for the individual subjects. The coe¢cient for valuation in a regression of the higher bid
is within 10% deviation of the equilibrium prediction (i. e. 1) for 10 subjects. For the lower bid this is the case for 11 subjects.
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and the equilibrium bid (valuation divided by 2), whereas a large share of the second unit (i. e. lower) bids
lies substantially below the equilibrium bid. According to Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, …rst-unit bids were
signi…cantly higher (p = 0:021) than the equilibrium bid (average di¤erence 5.48). The average second-unit
bid is 3.73 smaller than the equilibrium bid (p = 0:139). As can also be seen in Figures 1.5 and 1.6, except
for one subject in one auction, we observed overbidding of the valuation only for very small valuations and
to a very small degree. It seems that it is obvious to bidders in DA that overbidding is dominated.
A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows that the hypothesis that both, the higher and the lower bids (relative
to equilibrium bids) are drawn from the same distribution, can be rejected at the 5%-level for 12 out of 18
bidders. Hence, bid spreading (relative to equilibrium bids) was clearly more prominent in DA than in VA,
which is also con…rmed by a Mann-Whitney test (p = 0:0025). A linear regression of the bidspread yields,
over all subjects and periods (with robust standard errors) a negative coe¢cient (¡0:05) for period, which
is, however, not signi…cantly smaller than 0 (p = 0:83). Hence the bidspread on average decreased over
time, but the e¤ect is very small and insigni…cant. In fact, the aggregate bid spread is 38% in periods 1 to
5 and 36% in periods 6 to 10. Moreover, the aggregate bid spread increases from the …rst to the second
half of the experiment in …ve pairs, but decreases in only four.
These results are supported by estimating bid functions that are linear in the valuation. Over all
subjects, in a regression of the higher bid the coe¢cient for the valuation is 0:516 which is close to the
equilibrium value of 0.5, while it is substantially smaller in a regression of the lower bid (0.379). In bid
functions estimated for individual subjects the coe¢cient for valuation in a regression of the higher bid is
within 10% deviation of the equilibrium prediction only for 7 out of 18 subjects. In a regression of the
lower bid, this is the case for only 5 subjects.
At a …rst glance, a possible explanation for the bidspreading seems to be risk aversion. However, for
constant or increasing absolute risk aversion a lower bid on the second unit cannot be an equilibrium
strategy since the lower bid competes with the higher bid of the other bidder, which implies bidding higher
rather than lower on the second unit. Strongly decreasing risk aversion could explain bid spreading in
a single auction but would imply that bids decrease over time, i. e. after winning some auctions, which
they do not. In addition second unit bids below the risk-neutral equilibrium strategy (b = v2 ) cannot be
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consistent with any form of risk aversion, because risk aversion always predicts bidding higher than the
risk-neutral equilibrium on both units, since a risk averse person is willing to trade o¤ expected payo¤ for a
higher probability of winning a unit.18 The data are consistent with some statements in the questionnaires
that suggest that subjects were placing one bid as if they were highly risk averse and the other as if they
were risk seeking (“a high secure bid and a lower bid that could yield a higher pro…t”). This seems to
describe a highly myopic zero-pro…t aversion (since subjects try to secure a unit in each single auction).19
This behavior did not only lead to …rst bids being substantially higher than the equilibrium bid, but also
to average bids above equilibrium.
UPS In UPS, 34% of bid spreads were below 10% of the valuation (including 18% of the pairs that were
exactly equal). Only 33% of bid di¤erences exceeded 40% of the valuation (see Table 1). The aggregate bid
spread is 41%. Bid spreading (relative to equilibrium bids) was clearly larger in UPS than in VA (Mann-
Whitney test, p = 0:0082), but indistinguishable from that in DA (p = 0:807). A Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test applied to the individual bidders reveals that the hypothesis that both, the higher and the lower bids
(relative to equilibrium bids), are drawn from the same distribution can be rejected at the 5%-level for
13 out of 20 bidders. There is no clear time trend concerning the bid spread. A linear regression of the
bidspread yields, over all subjects and periods (with robust standard errors) an insigni…cantly (p = 0:571)
negative coe¢cient (-0.23) for period, suggesting that the bid spreading in UPS slightly decreased over
time. However, the aggregate bid spread relative to the equilibrium bid is 40% both in periods 1 to 5 and
18 Furthermore, according to Rabin (2000) and Rabin and Thaler (2001) risk aversion on such small stakes cannot be
reconciled with the maximization of the expected utility of wealth. (According to Cox and Sadiraj, 2001, however, it is
consistent with the maximization of the expected utility of income). Since no losses are involved (at least as long as the
valuation is not overbid), the explanation of myopic loss aversion given by Rabin and Thaler for low stake risk aversion does
not explain our results either.
19 This zero-pro…t aversion is essentially equivalent to a “joy of winning” that has been suggested as an alternative explanation
for overbidding in single unit auctions (see e. g. Goeree et al., 2002, for a comparison of risk aversion and joy of winning).
Our data then imply that there is only a joy of winning one unit, whereas winning a second unit does not yield additional
joy (but winning at least one unit yields additional joy in each auction, so it is a myopic joy of winning). Furthermore,
the underbidding on the second unit suggests that joy of winning would have to be coupled with risk seeking to arrive at a
complete explanation of the observed behavior.
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in periods 6 to 10. It decreases from the …rst to the second half of the 10 auctions in six pairs, and increases
in four.
Estimating bid functions that are linear in the valuation, yields over all subjects a coe¢cient for the
valuation of 0.83 (constant 13.15) in a regression of the higher bid and 0.63 (constant 4.29) in a regression
of the lower bid. The coe¢cient for valuation in regressions of the higher bid is for 6 subjects within 10%
deviation of the equilibrium prediction.
4.4 E¢ciency
Result 4 (E¢ciency) (i) Due to demand reduction, e¢ciency is lower in UPO than in the other auc-
tion formats, that do not di¤er substantially in terms of e¢ciency.
(ii) E¢ciency increases, however, signi…cantly over time in AA and hence in periods 6 to 10, e¢ciency
in AA is signi…cantly higher than in DA, UPO, and UPS.
In equilibrium both units are allocated to the bidder with the higher valuation in AA, VA, and DA, but
only one unit in the DR–equilibrium of the uniform-price auctions. An e¢cient allocation requires allocating
both units to the bidder with the higher valuation, because independent of the price this maximizes social
welfare, the sum of the bidders’ pro…ts and the auctioneer’s revenue.20
20 This notion of e¢ciency is common in experimental auctions. It corresponds to non-experimental auctions, where the
valuation represents, for example, an intrinsic valuation of the buyer for the good (in case of works of art) or prospective
pro…ts in a market (in case of licenses). In the experiment, however, both the valuation and the prices paid correspond to
transfers between experimenter and subjects. Hence the total payo¤ (including the experimenter) is constant. This would not
be reason to worry, if experimental subjects did not care for e¢ciency. There is, however, evidence that experimental subjects
directly care for e¢ciency and not only for their own payo¤ and the fairness of the allocation (see Charness and Rabin, 2002,
and Engelmann and Strobel, 2004). It therefore matters whether the subjects include the experimenter in their considerations.
If not (which is usually assumed), the e¢ciency measure corresponds to the joint payo¤ of the bidders, i. e. (v1¡p1)+(v2¡p2)
(with vi being the valuation of the bidder who obtained unit i, and pi the price paid for this unit), whereas the standard
measure of e¢ciency simply amounts to v1 + v2. This could lead e¢ciency minded subjects to cooperate in the experiment
(causing e¢ciency losses according to our standard measure), but not outside the laboratory. If they include the experimenter,
e¢ciency concerns are irrelevant since the total payo¤ is constant, unless subjects assume that they have higher marginal
utility from the payo¤ than the sponsor of the experiment, or if they also consider the experimenters’ future salary increases
due to ground-breaking publications. In the latter case, they should try to produce interesting results.
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Because valuations are randomly and independently drawn in our experiment, simply comparing treat-
ments with respect to the achieved total welfare would be biased by these random draws. We compare
the auction formats with respect to three di¤erent e¢ciency measures that are aimed to minimize this
bias: allocative e¢ciency, relative e¢ciency loss and relative e¢ciency. The term allocative e¢ciency refers
simply to the number of e¢ciently (i. e. to the bidder with the higher valuation) allocated units. Measuring
allocative e¢ciency in this way does not re‡ect the actual magnitude of e¢ciency losses due to misalloca-
tions. If the “wrong” bidder obtains a unit, his valuation may be substantially or only slightly below the
other bidder’s valuation, causing either dramatic or small welfare losses. Our second and third measures
take this into account. With relative e¢ciency loss we refer to the loss in terms of total welfare relative
to the maximum possible e¢ciency loss. Relative e¢ciency measures the achieved total welfare relative
to maximum possible welfare. In Table 2 we report for each measure aggregate results over all pairs and
periods, as well as separated into the …rst …ve periods and the second …ve periods.21
Concerning allocative e¢ciency over all periods, treatments do not di¤er much (AA 84%, VA 82,5 %,
DA 83,3 %, UPO 74 % UPS 81 %, see Table 2). None of the pair-wise di¤erences is signi…cant (p > 0:2).
In particular, in UPS the allocative e¢ciency was only slightly below that in AA, DA, and VA, although
the predicted allocative e¢ciency in the DR–equilibrium is only half of that predicted in the three other
auctions. In each of AA, VA, and UPS for exactly one pair all units were allocated e¢ciently. The low
allocative e¢ciency in UPO is due to the coordination of some pairs on the DR–equilibrium. According to
relative e¢ciency losses and relative e¢ciency, in UPO e¢ciency is (marginally) signi…cantly lower than in
both AA (p = 0:059 resp. p = 0:041) and DA (p = 0:086 resp. p = 0:06).
Di¤erences in e¢ciency are far more pronounced in the second …ve periods (allocative e¢ciency: AA
91%, VA 88 %, DA 85,5 %, UPO 76 % UPS 82 %). Indeed, e¢ciency increases over time are substantial
only in DA, VA, and AA, and signi…cant only in AA (p = 0:039; p = 0:011; and p = 0:025 for allocative
e¢ciency, relative e¢ciency loss and relative e¢ciency, respectively; in all other treatments p > 0:2 with
21 Aggregates are not averages over the relative measures, but relative measures computed with respect to aggregate data.
For example, relative e¢ciency for one treatment corresponds to the total achieved welfare by all pairs in this treatment over
all (respectively the …rst or second …ve) periods, devided by the aggregated maximum possible welfare. This minimizes the
impact of outliers based on small valuations.
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Periods all 1 – 5 6 – 10
allocative e¢ciency 84 % 77 % 91 %
AA relative e¢ciency loss 9.2 % 18 % 0.8 %
relative e¢ciency 95.6 % 91.4 % 99.6 %
allocative e¢ciency 82.5 % 77 % 88 %
VA relative e¢ciency loss 13.8 % 16.8 % 11.1 %
relative e¢ciency 93.3 % 92.4 % 94.2 %
allocative e¢ciency 83.3 % 81.1 % 85.5 %
DA relative e¢ciency loss 7.1 % 9.8 % 4.5 %
relative e¢ciency 96.5 % 95.3 % 97.8 %
allocative e¢ciency 81 % 80 % 82 %
UPS relative e¢ciency loss 12.2 % 11.5 % 12.9 %
relative e¢ciency 92.9 % 93.5 % 92.2 %
allocative e¢ciency 74 % 72 % 76 %
UPO relative e¢ciency loss 25.9 % 25.8 % 25.9 %
relative e¢ciency 87.6 % 88.5 % 86.6 %
Table 2: E¢ciency, measured by allocative e¢ciency, relative e¢ciency loss, and relative e¢ciency.
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respect to each measure). E¢ciency in periods 6 to 10 is signi…cantly higher in AA than in DA (p = 0:054;
and p = 0:045 for relative e¢ciency loss and relative e¢ciency, respectively), than in UPO (p = 0:073;
p = 0:008; and p = 0:011 for allocative e¢ciency, relative e¢ciency loss and relative e¢ciency, respectively),
and than in UPS (p = 0:085; p = 0:004; and p = 0:004). None of the other treatments di¤er signi…cantly
at a 10% level with respect to any e¢ciency measure in periods 6 to 10.
A more detailed look at the e¢ciency losses in AA reveals two main underlying reasons for ine¢cient
allocations. First, attempts to collude by demand reduction or by dropping at price 0 with both units in
the case of low valuations, apparently with the hope of reciprocation in later periods. Second, situations
where the valuations of both bidders were very close, so that small deviations from the equilibrium strategy
could result in misallocations. Since attempts to collude are largely unsuccessful, misallocations due to the
…rst reason have disappeared in the second half of the experiment. The remaining misallocations all lead
to very small losses in terms of welfare. Consequently, the decrease of the relative e¢ciency loss (from 18.3
% to 0.8 %) and the increase of the relative e¢ciency (from 91.4 % to 99.6 %) are much stronger than
the increase in allocative e¢ciency (from 77 % to 91 %), because exactly those misallocations that cause
substantial e¢ciency losses disappear over time. In contrast, in all other mechanisms, even in periods 6 to
10, the relative e¢ciency loss is larger than 4% and the relative e¢ciency below 98 %. In particular, while
the allocative e¢ciency also increases substantially in VA (from 77 % to 88 %), with respect to relative
e¢ciency losses (16.8 % to 11 %) and relative e¢ciency (92.4 % to 94.2 %) the increase in e¢ciency is much
weaker than in AA. In contrast to AA, in VA it is not the misallocations with substantial e¢ciency losses
that disappear over time. Hence while according to our overall results, none of the mechanisms appears to
be clearly preferable in terms of e¢ciency, AA clearly is preferable in case of experienced bidders.
The disappearance of misallocations due to collusive attempts also suggests that AA would have proved
superior in terms of e¢ciency if we had conducted more periods or with random matching, which makes
collusion less likely. In UPO, in contrast, under random matching, one bidder might teach a series of
other bidders the DR–equilibrium. Hence we suspect that the advantage of AA over UPO with respect
to e¢ciency would even be larger under random matching than under …xed matching, so that the …xed
matching employed in our experiment is a tougher test for the e¢ciency superiority of AA.
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While e¢ciency also increases (though not signi…cantly) over time in DA (and is second highest with
respect to relative e¢ciency in periods 6 to 10), the misallocations in DA were primarily caused by bid
spreading, a robust e¤ect in most pairs (indeed it increases from the …rst …ve to the second …ve periods in
…ve out of nine pairs). The increase in e¢ciency appears to be due primarily to the reduction in erratic
behavior, but the remaining misallocations due to bid spreading are likely to persist even in experiments
over substantially more periods. We suspect that increasing the number of bidders would emphasize the
advantage of AA over DA. On the one hand, underbidding in attempts to cooperate is likely to decrease in
AA for more than two bidders. On the other hand, if bid spreading in DA prevails for more bidders, the
probability that …rst unit bids of bidders with low valuation are higher than second unit bids of bidders
with high valuation (and hence for misallocations) increases in the number of bidders.
4.5 Auctioneer’s Revenues
Result 5 (Revenue) (i) Revenue equivalence is rejected for AA and DA, and it is also clearly rejected
for the uniform-price auctions.
(ii) Revenues are generally higher in sealed-bid than in open auctions.
The theoretical results predict equal expected revenues in equilibrium for VA, DA and AA. The empirical
(see Table 3.1) revenues in AA ranged from 44 % to 116 % of the equilibrium revenues in the individual
pairs with 84,74 % over all pairs. In VA empirical revenues were between 41 % and 131 % with 95,58
% over all pairs. In contrast, in DA the empirical revenues reached between 83 % and 145 % of the
equilibrium revenues in the individual pairs and 110,72 % over all pairs. The di¤erence in relative revenues
between AA and DA is signi…cant (Mann-Whitney test , p = 0:034), but both do not di¤er signi…cantly
from the equilibrium (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0:139 for DA and p = 0:203 for AA) or from VA
(Mann-Whitney, p = 0:545 for AA and p = 0:165 for DA).
In the uniform–price auctions the (DR–) equilibrium revenues are 0. The empirical revenues were
naturally higher. To compare the revenues in the two uniform–price auctions, we measure the revenues
relative to the TT–equilibrium revenues (which correspond to the expected equilibrium revenues in the
other auctions). In UPO the revenues ranged from 1 % to 108 % of the (TT–) equilibrium revenues, with
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68.97 % over all pairs. In UPS they ranged from 80 % to 161 % and reached 106,74 % over all pairs. The
di¤erence between UPO and UPS is clearly signi…cant (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0:019). Furthermore, the
revenues were signi…cantly smaller than in TT–equilibrium in UPO (Wilcoxon sign-rank test, p = 0:028)
but not signi…cantly di¤erent in UPS (p = 0:507). Thus revenue equivalence, which would be implied if
the same equilibrium is played in both auction formats, does not hold for the two uniform–price auctions
either. This is, of course, consistent with result 2 that DR is more frequent in UPO than in UPS.
In line with the equilibrium prediction the relative revenues in UPO were signi…cantly lower than in
VA and DA (Mann-Whitney, p = 0:070 and p = 0:006; respectively), but only insigni…cantly lower than in
AA (p = 0:290). In contrast to the equilibrium prediction, the relative revenues in UPS were even slightly
larger than those in AA (p = 0:199).
4.6 Bidder Payo¤s
Result 6 (Bidder Payo¤s) (i) Bidder payo¤s are signi…cantly lower than the DR-equilibrium predic-
tion in UPO and UPS.
(ii) In DA, bidder payo¤s are signi…cantly lower than in equilibrium, in UPO, and in AA.
The pair that played closest to the (DR–) equilibrium in UPO naturally received almost the (DR–)
equilibrium payo¤ (see Table 4.1, UPO, pair 4), while the other pairs and all pairs in UPS obtained payo¤s
substantially below the equilibrium payo¤ in most of the auctions. In some auctions, however, the latter
pairs obtained above equilibrium payo¤s due to underbidding of subjects with low valuations. In UPO
the bidder payo¤s ranged from 38% to 102% of the DR–equilibrium payo¤, with an average of 68%. In
UPS they ranged from 51% to 88% with an average of 69%. While bidder pro…ts in both UPS and UPO
were signi…cantly lower than the DR–equilibrium payo¤ (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0:007 in UPO,
p = 0:005 in UPS), in UPS they were even lower than the TT–equilibrium payo¤s (Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, p = 0:059) and payo¤s relative to the TT–equilibrium payo¤s were signi…cantly smaller in UPS than
in UPO (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0:034).22
22 The comparison between UPS and UPO yields di¤erent results depending on which equilibrium is used as a benchmark
because the valuations were randomly drawn and hence di¤erent in the two treatments.
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In AA the collusive attempts resulted in payo¤s that exceeded equilibrium payo¤s in …ve pairs (see
Table 4.1, the di¤erence is not signi…cant: Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0:445). The extreme excess
pro…ts of pair 4 (they achieved 289% of equilibrium payo¤s) were partly a coincidence. In several auctions
the valuations of both bidders in this pair were very close, so that the equilibrium payo¤s were very small.
Attempts to cooperate through demand reduction or generous dropping out at a low price with both units
led to payo¤s substantially above the equilibrium. In addition, the low bidder payo¤s in pair 10 (54% of
equilibrium payo¤s) were partly driven by a chance event. One bidder always had the lower valuation.
This seems to have caused some frustration which resulted in overbidding, which may have been driven by
spite or just by a desire to experiment. The other pairs’ payo¤s ranged from 91% to 138% with an overall
average of 107%.
In VA the bidder pro…ts were close to the equilibrium with an average of 91% over all pairs (di¤erence
is not signi…cant: Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0:203). While four pairs were within 5% deviation of the
equilibrium payo¤, one pair only achieved 43%, and another 164% (see Table 4.1).
In DA, since average bids were above equilibrium, the bidders’ payo¤s were consistently lower than
under the equilibrium prediction in most pairs (see Table 4.1). Seven out of nine pairs were below 90%
of the equilibrium payo¤s, one pair obtained 113% and the average was 82% of the equilibrium. The
bidder pro…ts in DA were signi…cantly lower than the equilibrium payo¤s (Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
p = 0:028). Furthermore, pro…ts (relative to the (TT–) equilibrium) were signi…cantly lower in DA than in
UPO (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0:028) and AA (p = 0:041).
4.7 E¤ects UPO $ UPS
One might suspect that the subjects would learn how to play the payo¤ dominant DR–equilibrium of the
uniform–price auction better in the open version. They might, however, be able to transfer the DR they
learn in UPO to UPS, whereas playing UPS before UPO should not help them …nding the DR-equilibrium
in UPO. In order to check whether the intuition is right, we let the subjects who played UPO and UPS
play another ten auctions in the other uniform–price format. We will refer to the ten open auctions that
were played after the sealed–bid auctions as UPsO and to the sealed–bid auctions played after the open
auctions as UPoS.
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Result 7 (i) Bidders who have played UPO …rst, play closer to the DR-equilibrium in the sealed-bid
auction than those in UPS. They exhibit, however, less DR than they did in UPO.
(ii) There appear to be slight hysteresis e¤ects for bidders who …rst play UPS and then the open auction.
They exhibit less demand reduction than those who started with UPO.
Three of the pairs that played UPO …rst cooperated almost from the start and continued to do so until
the end of the open auctions. Figure 5 depicts for UPOS the percentage of the (DR–) equilibrium pro…t
each of those three pairs reached per auction. While the pairs realized roughly the DR–equilibrium pro…t
most of the time in UPO, this did not carry over to the subsequent sealed–bid auctions with the same
pricing rule. There, the bidders’ pro…ts di¤ered substantially from equilibrium pro…ts across all pairs.
If one looks at all pairs, the bidder pro…ts between UPS and UPoS (see Table 4.2) did not di¤er
signi…cantly (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0:258 for pro…ts relative to TT-equilibrium, p = 0:762 for pro…ts
relative to DR-equilibrium), suggesting that bidders did not learn to play the DR–equilibrium in UPS
even if they had played UPO before. However, the auctioneer’s revenue was much lower in UPoS than in
UPS (71,33 % vs. 106,74 % of the TT–equilibrium revenue, see Tables 3.2 and 3.1, Mann-Whitney test,
p = 0:013). In UPoS it was also signi…cantly lower than in the TT–equilibrium (Wilcoxon signed-rank
tests, p = 0:047). Furthermore, e¢ciency was signi…cantly lower in UPoS than in UPS (allocative e¢ciency
67.5% vs. 81%, according to Mann-Whitney tests p = 0:031 for allocative e¢ciency, p = 0:049 for relative
e¢ciency loss, p = 0:096 and for relative e¢ciency).23 In addition, the number of extremely low (0 or
1) bids was signi…cantly higher in UPoS than in UPS (36 vs. 13, Mann-Whitney test, p = 0:047). These
results indicate that behavior got closer to playing the DR–equilibrium in the sealed-bid auction if the open
auction was played …rst.
Moreover, analysis of the scatter diagrams provides a better understanding of UPoS. Figure 3.1 and 3.2
depict the …rst and second unit bids in UPoS. The average …rst-unit bid was 5.02 below the equilibrium but
a regression of the di¤erence between the higher bid and the valuation shows that underbidding decreased
signi…cantly (p = 0:068) over time. In total, even fewer …rst unit bids were truthful in UPoS than in UPS
23 Interestingly, the allocative e¢ciency was even slightly (but insigni…cantly) lower in UPoS than in UPO.
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(20.5% of bids were exactly equal to the valuation and an additional 10.5% were one ECU above or below).
Compared with Figure 1.1 and 1.2 (UPS), bids seem to be closer to equilibrium behavior. This is even
more true for those pairs that seem to have found the DR–equilibrium in the open auction they played
before (see Figures 3.3 and 3.4). The aggregate bid spread in UPoS (44%) was larger than in UPS (40%),
but not signi…cantly (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0:545).
For the pairs that played UPS …rst and then UPsO we got an unexpected result. As one might predict,
bidders did not learn to play the DR–equilibrium in the UPS design. Surprisingly, though, this seems to
have partially extended to UPsO. On the one hand, in UPsO two pairs played close to the DR–equilibrium
and bidder pro…ts were on average close to those in UPO (69,71% vs. 67,83% of the DR–equilibrium pro…ts,
see Tables 4.2 and 4.1). Bidder pro…ts (relative to the TT–equilibrium) increased signi…cantly from UPS
to UPsO (p = 0:028; Wilcoxon signed-rank test), as did the number of extremely low (0 or 1) bids on the
second unit (13 vs. 36, Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0:079), while the auctioneer’s revenues decreased
signi…cantly (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0:013).
On the other hand, the number of extremely low bids is considerably (though far from signi…cantly)
smaller than in UPO (48). Furthermore, the auctioneer’s revenues were higher (but not signi…cantly,
p = 0:706) in UPsO than in UPO (80.22 % vs. 68.97 % of the TT–equilibrium revenue, see Tables 2.2
and 2.1) and the e¢ciency is higher in UPsO than in UPO with respect to all three measures but far from
signi…cantly so and it is only marginally smaller than in UPS. The allocative e¢ciency in UPsO is even
larger than in UPoS (Mann-Whitney, p = 0:072) opposed to what one would expect from a comparison of
the mechanisms and suggesting that indeed behavior from the …rst set of auctions carries to some extent
over to the second set. Finally, bidders violated the requirement of the DR–equilibrium to drop out on one
unit immediately once the other bidder had dropped out, more often in UPsO (66 % of the cases where it
was possible). In UPO, it was violated in only 55 % of the cases. This does not seem to be attributable
to a lower rationality of the bidders in UPsO than in UPO, because truthful bidding on the …rst unit was
more frequent in UPsO than in UPO (out of 59 observable …rst-unit bids, 45.8% were exactly equal to the
valuation and an additional 25.4% were one ECU above or below).24
24 Alsemgeest et al. (1998) …nd similar hysteresis e¤ects in open auctions. Subjects who play the open auction with multi-
unit demand after playing the open auction with single unit demand exhibit substantially less demand reduction than those
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Figure 4.1 depicts the observed bids in the UPsO. As Figure 4.2 shows, there are still two pairs who
played close to the equilibrium prediction. Figure 4.3 depicts the behavior of those pairs in the preceding
UPS treatment.
4.8 Learning
It is striking that there seems to be almost no learning within one auction format. In most cases where
bidders played close to equilibrium strategies, they started doing so in the …rst three auctions. Also time
trends led partially towards the equilibrium (e.g. bid spreading in VA decreased and increased in UPoS,
underbidding on the …rst unit decreased in UPoS), but partially away from the equilibrium (e.g. bid-
spreading decreased and overbidding increased in UPS). The major exception appears to be that bidders
learn that attempts to collude do not pay in AA and that these are consequently abandoned.
That we did not …nd much learning is certainly in part because we only played ten auctions. The
virtual absence of learning trends after the third auction is still surprising, though. Furthermore, most
subjects played the auctions very fast and took very little time to review the results. Hence it appears to
us, that simply increasing the number of auctions would not have resulted in signi…cantly more learning.
This would rather require the slowing down of the subjects, for example by imposing a minimal time they
are shown the feedback.
4.9 Questionnaires
In all treatments there were participants who indicated in post–experimental questionnaires that they tried
to cooperate, as well as participants who explicitly behaved competitively or even spiteful. There is no
indication that subjects realized that demand reduction is an equilibrium in the uniform-price auctions. In
the uniform-price auctions as well as in the Vickrey and Ausubel auctions, several subjects realized that
complete demand reduction is (weakly) payo¤ dominating all (other) equilibria and some realized that in
UPO cooperation is easier than in UPS, while none made an explicit reference to equilibrium logic. Many
subjects cited avoiding losses as a primary aim or as a constraint on their attempts to maximize their
payo¤s.
who played the multi-unit demand auction …rst.
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5 Conclusions
The results of our experiments are in line with some of the theoretical predictions, while they clearly
contradict others. Demand reduction occurs in the uniform-price auctions, though it also does to a lesser
extent in the Ausubel auction. The allocative e¢ciency is lowest in UPO, and highest in AA, where the
latter di¤ers only slightly from UPS, VA, and DA over all periods with respect to the number of e¢ciently
allocated units, but the causes of misallocations appear to be least robust in AA. As a consequence, e¢ciency
is signi…cantly higher in AA than in DA, UPO, and UPS in the second half of the experiment. The revenue
equivalence of AA and DA is clearly rejected, as it is for the two uniform-price auctions. In clear contrast to
the theory, the auctioneer’s revenues do not primarily depend on the pricing-rule, but whether the auction
is open or sealed–bid.
Some of the results do not come as a surprise, though not predicted by the equilibrium analysis.
Overbidding is more frequent in UPS and in VA than in UPO and AA, apparently since in the sealed–
bid auctions it is less clear that overbidding is dominated. Coordination on the DR–equilibrium seems
to be much easier in UPO than in UPS, because one bidder can signal by dropping out. Bidding above
the equilibrium strategy is much more frequent in DA than in VA, and in particular in AA, since in the
latter cases this involves overbidding, and it is easier to recognize that this is not optimal, than it is to
calculate the optimal bids in DA. These behavioral e¤ects cause the auctioneer’s revenues to be higher in
the sealed–bid auctions than in the open auctions.
Our primary results are qualitatively in line with those of Kagel and Levin (2001), though some dif-
ferences apparently result from our design involving two human players. They also …nd more demand
reduction in the uniform–price open auction than in the uniform–price sealed–bid auction. However, while
they …nd much less demand reduction in the Ausubel auction, we …nd more extremely low bids in early
stages of AA than in UPS. Apparently these extremely low bids were the results of attempts to elicit
collusion, which is impossible in their design with simulated opponents.
In accordance with our results, Kagel and Levin (2001) also …nd much more overbidding in the uniform–
price sealed–bid auction than in the two open auctions. Furthermore, in their experiment as well as in
ours UPS yields higher revenues to the auctioneer but lower allocative e¢ciency than AA, although the
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di¤erence in e¢ciency is smaller in our experiment, again probably resulting from attempts to collude in
AA (in the second half of our experiment, when attempts to collude have ceased, e¢ciency is substantially
and signi…cantly larger in AA than in UPS). Hence we provide some further indication for this theoretically
unanticipated trade-o¤ between revenue and e¢ciency in AA and UPS. Thus, their main results do not
seem to depend critically on the simulation of other participants by computers, although the superior
performance of the Ausubel auction seems to be weakened in our interactive environment. In contrast to
Kagel and Levin, in our experiment there seems to be surprisingly little learning both within and across
auction rules (with the exception of AA where bidders learn that collusion does not work). Those subjects
who manage to determine the equilibrium do so almost at once. This is particularly surprising given
that our interactive environments seem to be more complicated and that we did not provide hints against
overbidding.
In line with our observation that the pricing-rule is less important for revenues than whether the auction
is sealed–bid or open, List and Lucking-Reiley (2000) …nd little di¤erences in revenues between VA and
UPS. They also …nd more overbidding on the …rst unit in UPS compared to VA, as we do.25 Our results
also con…rm the observation of List and Lucking-Reiley that the bid spreading is larger in UPS than in VA,
and con…rm that this leads to (slightly) more misallocations.
What is surprising, though, in our experiment, is that bid spreading is very strong in DA, where it
is not consistent with equilibrium behavior. This seems to be caused by a dislike for zero pro…ts which
leads subjects to increase the probability of acquiring at least one unit at the expense of expected pro…ts.
This zero pro…t aversion has no distorting e¤ect in the other auction mechanisms, since the probability
of acquiring at least one unit (without making losses) is maximized by bidding the valuation on the …rst
unit, consistent with equilibrium behavior. The bid spreading in DA cannot be completely explained by
risk aversion, because the majority of second-unit bids is below the equilibrium, a …nding inconsistent with
risk aversion. Since the observed bidding behavior at …rst glance looks perfectly consistent with the usual
25 In a related experiment, Engelbrecht-Wiggans, List and Reiley (2004), …nd that this e¤ect disappears with 3 or 5 bidders.
They also …nd, consistent with the theoretical prediction, that demand reduction is still present, but reduced if the number
of bidders is increased.
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overbidding in …rst-price single unit auctions but cannot be explained by risk aversion, one might even
argue that this raises doubts about the explanatory adequacy of risk aversion in accounting for overbidding
in single unit auctions.
This bid spreading in DA as well as the overbidding on the …rst unit in UPS might be rationalized by
a utility function that accounts for the bidder’s expected payo¤ on the one hand, and, on the other hand,
explicitly values the probability of winning at least one unit. Maximizing such a utility function would
imply a higher bid on the …rst unit than suggested by expected utility maximization, even if this led to
making losses with positive probability.
Another interesting observation is that the total allocative e¢ciency is almost identical in VA and AA.
Ine¢cient allocations in AA seem partially caused by bidders hoping that the second bidder will play the
weakly dominated strategy of dropping out after a dropout of the …rst bidder (which the second bidder
then sometimes does), whereas ine¢cient allocations in VA result from a higher number of bids that deviate
from the valuation, though only slightly. The latter observation may possibly be due to the fact that in VA
it is less transparent to the bidders that bidding their own valuation is dominant. Hence we …nd that the
possibly more transparent mechanism in AA can compensate for the weaker equilibrium concept compared
to VA, a …nding in agreement with the results in Kagel et al. (2003). After some experience, though, the
collusive attempts in AA are given up and e¢ciency is higher than in VA.
Manelli et al. (2001) compare VA and AA in a design where three bidders compete for three units
and each can buy three units, but the third unit has a value of 0. They study both auctions with and
without a common value component. In one of their experiments (treatment ASU), they …nd that due to
overbidding in VA, the revenues are higher than in AA. Since some bidders in AA bid aggressively on the
third unit, causing e¢ciency losses, the total e¢ciency is roughly equal. These results are in line with ours.
In contrast, in their second experiment (treatment UI), where overbidding is weaker, in VA the e¢ciency
is higher but the revenues are lower than in AA.
One interesting feature of our research is that statements in the post-experimental questionnaires are
similar after the uniform-price auctions and after the AA. Several participants tried to cooperate by reducing
demand and they observed that this worked well in UPO, but less so in UPS and even less in AA. It seems,
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however, that they all failed to realize that cooperation was stable when it was an equilibrium. Hence, the
equilibrium prediction organizes the data well for some pairs although they do not think in these terms.
This is, of course, interesting from a general perspective. Equilibria can yield good predictions even if they
are possibly too sophisticated for subjects to determine, given that equilibrium choices can result from less
sophisticated thought processes.
Finally, there are some policy conclusions to be drawn from the research. If the objective of the auction-
eer is a combination of the maximization of e¢ciency and of his revenues, the uniform–price open auction
is clearly not preferable. Demand reduction leads both to a reduction of revenues and to a misallocation
of one unit.26 If the primary aim is the e¢cient allocation, AA seems to be best suited, in particular if
bidders have time to gain experience, while if the focus is on revenues, the sealed–bid auctions perform
best due to frequent overbidding in the case of UPS and to bids generally exceeding equilibrium bids in
DA. A mechanism that is easy to understand seems best suited to allocating the units e¢ciently, while a
sealed–bid mechanism where bids have to be determined completely unaware of the other bidders’ choices
may raise higher revenues.
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A Equilibria of UPS and UPO
The setting we analyze corresponds to example 3 in Ausubel and Cramton (2002). Whereas they present
the DR– and the TT–equilibrium as two examples of equilibria of the uniform–price auction, we characterize
a continuum of equilibria of both, the sealed–bid and the open version of the uniform–price auction in this
setting.
In the UPO we show uniqueness of the demand reduction equilibrium under certain re…nements, which,
we believe, contributes to the literature on multi–unit auctions. Uniqueness of low price equilibria has so
far been shown only in a framework with complete information on valuations.27
A.1 Equilibria of UPS
We …rst show that the strategies
b1(vi) = vi (7)
b2(vi) =
8<: xk if vi 2 [xk; yk);vi otherwise.
27 See e. g. Grimm et al. (2003).
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with K ¸ 1; xK+1 = V , and [xk; yk), k = 1; : : :K, a sequence with the following properties: x1 ¸ 0,
xk < yk, and yk · xk+1, are an equilibrium of UPS. In order to simplify the calculations we show this for
V = 1. Clearly, this also extends to arbitrary values of V .
First note that in both uniform–price formats it is a weakly dominant strategy for the bidders to bid
their valuation vi on the …rst unit (i. e. their higher bid always equals their true valuation). Their bid on
the …rst unit will only determine the price if it is the highest rejected bid, i. e. if the bidder does not get a
unit. As in the standard argument for the second price auction for the single unit case, lowering the bid
implies the risk of missing a pro…table deal, whereas overbidding might result in buying a unit at a loss.
This is even more obvious in the open auction. If bidder i has already dropped out on one unit, dropping
out on the remaining unit before his valuation vi is reached guarantees a pro…t of 0, whereas continuing
might yield a positive pro…t. Staying in above vi causes a loss as soon as the other bidder drops out. It
remains to be shown that the bid on the second unit as stated in (7) is indeed part of an equilibrium
strategy.
In the following we show that if bidder j plays according to (7), it is indeed a best reply for bidder i
to play (7) as well. We proceed in two steps. First, suppose bidder i’s valuation is in a demand reduction
interval, i. e. vi 2 [xk; yk). Then
(a) If vj ¸ yk bidder i’s pro…t is zero if he plays (7) and he cannot increase his pro…t by deviating.
(b) If vj 2 [xk; yk) then for bidder i any bid below xk or above vi clearly does not pay. Consider b2(vi) = z
with z 2 [xk; vi). We get
¼i(b2(vi) = z) = Prfvj > zjxk · vj < ykg(vi ¡ z)
+ Prfvj · zjxk · vj < ykg2 (vi ¡ E[vj jxk · vj · z])
=
yk ¡ z
yk ¡ xk (vi ¡ z) +
z ¡ xk
yk ¡ xk 2
µ
vi ¡ z + xk2
¶
= (vi ¡ z) + (z ¡ xk)yk ¡ xk (vi ¡ xk):
Taking the derivative with respect to z yields ¡1 + vi¡xkyk¡xk which is negative for vi < yk. Therefore,
it does not pay to deviate from b2 = xk if the competitor’s valuation is in the same interval, which
yields ¼i(b2(vi) = xk) = vi ¡ xk.
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(c) if vj 2 [yl¡1; xl), l · k, the price on any unit bidder i obtains is always vj . Since bidder i clearly
prefers getting two units at price vj to getting one unit, it does not pay to deviate from (7) either.
(d) if vj 2 [xl; yl), l < k, then for bidder i bidding below xl clearly does not pay. Any bid greater or
equal to yl yields the same outcome, namely obtaining both units for vj . Consider b2(vi) = z with
z 2 [xl; yl). We get
¼i(b2(vi) = z) = Prfvj > zjxl · vj < ylg(vi ¡ z)
+ Prfvj · zjxl · vj < ylg2 (vi ¡ E[vj jxl · vj · z])
=
yl ¡ z
yl ¡ xl (vi ¡ z) +
z ¡ xl
yl ¡ xl 2
µ
vi ¡ z + xl2
¶
= (vi ¡ z) + (z ¡ xl)yl ¡ xl (vi ¡ xl):
Taking the derivative with respect to z yields ¡1 + vi¡xlyl¡xl which is positive for vi > yl. Since any bid
greater or equal to yl yields the same outcome (and vi ¸ yl), it does not pay to deviate from b2 = xk
if the competitor’s valuation is in a lower demand reduction interval.
Hence, independent of the interval where the other bidder’s valuation lies, deviating from (7) does not
pay for a bidder with a valuation in a demand reduction interval. It remains to be shown that there is also
no incentive to deviate from (7) if the bidder’s valuation is in a truth–telling interval, i. e. vi 2 [yk¡1; xk).
For vj ¸ xk, vj 2 [yl¡1; xl), l < k, and vj 2 [xl; yl), l < k the same arguments as in (a), (c), and (d) apply.
If vj 2 [yk¡1; xk), bidder i will receive no unit if vi < vj . If vi ¸ vj the price on any unit bidder i obtains
will be vj . So he prefers getting two units to getting one unit. Therefore, deviation from (7) never pays if
the other bidder plays this strategy.
A.2 Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of UPO
In order to show that the equilibria of UPS, as given in (7), are also perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) of
UPO, we need to specify beliefs about the other bidder’s valuation that make the strategy (7) sequentially
rational and that are derived from Bayes’ rule at least on the equilibrium path. Let ¹i(vj¢) denote the
subjective probability assigned by bidder i to the event that the other bidder’s valuation is (weakly) smaller
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than v. The following beliefs support the strategy (7) as a PBE. In particular with these beliefs bidders
stick to their strategy even if they observe a deviation by the other bidder.
(a) As long as the other bidder does not drop out on any unit, bidder i believes that the other bidder’s
valuation is uniformly distributed on the interval of valuations for which equilibrium behavior does
not prescribe dropping out at lower prices. Formally, if the current price p 2 (xk; yk); then
¹i(vjp) =
8<: v¡yk1¡yk for v 2 [yk; 1];0 for v 2 [0; yk);
and if p 2 [yk; xk+1]; then
¹i(vjp) =
8<: v¡p1¡p for v 2 [p; 1];0 for v 2 [0; p):
(b) If the other bidder drops out on one unit at zk 2 [xk; yk), k = 1; : : :K, bidder i updates his subjective
distribution function as follows:
¹i(vjzk; p) =
8>>><>>>:
1 for v 2 [yk; 1];
v¡p
yk¡p for v 2 [p; yk);
0 for v 2 [0; p);
with p 2 [zk; yk) being the current price in the auction.
(c) If the other bidder drops out on one unit at zk 2 [yk; xk+1), k = 1; : : :K, bidder i updates his
subjective distribution function as follows:
¹i(vjzk; p) =
8>>><>>>:
1 for v 2 [minfxk+1; vig; 1];
v¡p
minfxk+1;vig¡p for v 2 [p;minfxk+1; vig);
0 for v 2 [0; p):
with p 2 [zk; xk+1) being the current price in the auction.
(d) If the current price p exceeds the upper limit of the interval where the other bidder dropped out on
one unit, bidder i believes the other bidder’s valuation to be in the current interval. In particular,
bidder i updates his subjective distribution function as follows:
¹i(vjzk; p) =
8>>><>>>:
1 for v 2 [yl; 1];
v¡p
yl¡p for v 2 [p; yl);
0 for v 2 [0; p);
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if the current price in the auction is in a demand reduction interval, p 2 [xl; yl), l > k, and
¹i(vjzk; p) =
8>>><>>:
1 for v 2 [minfxl+1; vig; 1];
v¡p
minfxl+1;vig¡p for v 2 [p;minfxl+1; vig);
0 for v 2 [0; p);
if the current price in the auction is in a truth–telling interval, p 2 [yl; xl+1), l > k.
(e) If the other bidder drops out on both units the auction is over and beliefs can be arbitrary.
Note that if there are truth–telling intervals, bidder i’s beliefs depend on his own type (i. e. valuation).
This violates requirements of some de…nitions (e. g. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) of a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium. Furthermore, type dependent beliefs are de…nitely precluded in a Sequential Equilibrium
(Kreps and Wilson, 1982), because the beliefs are derived as a limit of beliefs resulting from completely
mixed strategies of the bidders. It is possible but tedious to show that equilibria involving TT–intervals
always require type dependent beliefs.28
If type dependent beliefs are not permitted, the only remaining equilibria are those that involve solely
DR-intervals (but arbitrarily many). To establish an equilibrium with several DR-intervals as a sequential
equilibrium one needs to choose a sequence of completely mixed strategies that assign a higher (by an
order of magnitude) probability to dropping out “too late” than “too early” (and a lower probability to
overbidding on any unit).29
28 The idea is that for any possible type the belief has to assign most of the mass on values lower than bidder i’s own value.
For a belief that does not depend on i’s own type, one obtains a contradiction (namely that the total mass exceeds 1) by
letting i’s own value approach p.
29 Consider for example a completely mixed strategy that is given by a density f2v (p) for a second drop-out at p given that
the bidder’s own value is v with f2v (p) = "K+1 for p 6= v (and all the remaining probability going to a drop-out at v) and
a density f1v (p) for a …rst drop-out at p of the following form: if v 2 [xk; yk) then f1v (p) = " for p 2 (xk ; v]; f1v (p) = "K for
p > v; f1v (p) = "k¡m+1 for p 2 [xm; ym), m < k (and all the remaining probability going to a drop-out at xk). The beliefs
derived by Bayesian updating then converge for any observed drop-out price p1 and any current price p towards the given
belief and the mixed strategy converges to the equilibrium strategy for " ! 0 .
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A.3 Payo¤ Dominance of the DR–Equilibrium
We show that among all equilibria of the uniform–price auction, the DR–equilibrium yields the highest
expected pro…t to the bidders. We …rst compare the expected pro…ts of the DR– and the TT–equilibrium:
¼DRi = vi and
¼TTi = Prfvj · vig2 (vi ¡ E[vj jvj · vi])
= v2i :
Thus, ¼DRi ¸ ¼TTi whenever vi · 1 which is always true. The expected payo¤ di¤erence is ¼DRi ¡ ¼TTi =
vi(1 ¡ vi). Now consider one of the intermediate equilibria. They yield the same payo¤ as the TT–
equilibrium unless both valuations are in the same demand reduction interval [xk; yk). In the latter case,
the payo¤ exceeds the TT-equilibrium payo¤ by ¢¼i
¢¼i = Prfvj 2 [xk; vi]g (vi ¡ xk ¡ 2 (vi ¡ E[vj jvj 2 [xk; vi]]))
+ Prfvj 2 [vi; yk]g(vi ¡ xk)
= (vi ¡ xk)
µ
vi ¡ xk ¡ 2
µ
vi ¡ vi + xk2
¶¶
+ (yk ¡ vi)(vi ¡ xk)
= (yk ¡ vi)(vi ¡ xk):
Therefore, we always get ¢¼i · ¼DRi ¡ ¼TTi , which proves that the DR–equilibrium is payo¤ dominant.
A.4 DR–Equilibrium in UPO
We can establish the uniqueness of the DR–equilibrium by requiring that a sequential equilibrium satis…es
support restriction (Madrigal et al., 1987). The latter amounts to requiring that a player does not assign
positive probability to another player’s type if he has assigned probability 0 to this type before. In UPO,
if bidder i observes that bidder j does not drop out on one unit at price xk, he concludes (in equilibrium)
that bidder j’s valuation is not in [xk; yk). Support restriction implies that even after observing that bidder
j drops out on one unit at z 2 (xk; yk), bidder i sticks to this belief, inconsistent with the beliefs needed
to support the equilibrium above. If beliefs satisfy support restriction it would be subjectively optimal to
follow a dropout at z immediately even for some bidders with vi > yk. This in turn makes it optimal for
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some bidders with valuations above yk to drop out slightly above xk and hence earlier than prescribed by
their DR-interval. Thus equilibria with multiple DR–intervals break down.
Madrigal et al. (1987) and Nöldeke and van Damme (1990) argue that support restriction is not an
appealing re…nement because in some games the only Nash–equilibrium does not satisfy support restriction.
Furthermore, it is not always intuitive. In our setting, for example, it is not clear why after an o¤–
equilibrium dropout it should be more plausible that a bidder erred by dropping out too early than by
dropping out too late. While uniqueness of an equilibrium is certainly appealing, the argument in our case
does not appear entirely convincing.
The DR–equilibrium is, however, also the only Perfect Bayesian equilibrium that has another appealing
property, namely that beliefs strictly follow Bayes’ rule also o¤ the equilibrium path in the sense that
if a bidder observes an o¤-equilibrium dropout on one unit he infers only that the opponent’s valuation
is higher than the dropout price and updates the initial distribution accordingly. Put di¤erently, this
requirement means that a bidder does not assume that he learns anything from another bidder’s move
that no type should take, but maintains, if possible, the assumption that the other bidder is not playing a
weakly dominated strategy.
To see that only the DR–equilibrium satis…es this requirement, recall that in the uniform-price open
auction it is a weakly dominant strategy to remain active on the …rst unit until one’s true value vi is
reached, and that bidder i’s payo¤ in the DR–equilibrium is vi ¡ 0. Furthermore, note that in equilibrium
a drop-out on a single unit only occurs at the lower boundary xk of a demand reduction interval.
Consider an equilibrium as in Appendix A.2 but where the beliefs ful…ll the above requirement, i. e. if
bidder j drops out on one unit at any current price p 2 [0; 1] that is not equal to an xk, bidder i believes
bidder j’s valuation to be uniformly distributed on [p; 1].30
Assume bidder j drops out at price y ¸ 0 (and y 6= xk for all k). Now bidder i has two options: Dropping
out on one unit as well guarantees him pro…t vi ¡ y. In contrast, staying active with the second unit until
30 One could also consider the requirement that bidder i uses strict Bayesian updating of his last belief. In that case if
p 2 (xk; yk), i would believe the valuation of j to be uniformly distributed in [yk; 1]: But this implies support restriction,
which leads to a breakdown of equilibria as described above.
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some price x > y yields, (if the other bidder uses the weakly dominant strategy to bid his valuation on the
…rst unit) with (subjective) probability 1¡x1¡y a pro…t of vi ¡ x (if bidder j’s valuation exceeds x), whereas
with probability x¡y1¡y bidder j will drop out at a price below x which implies an expected price of
x+y
2 and
thus an expected pro…t 2(vi ¡ x+y2 ): Hence the total expected payo¤ from staying active until a price x > y
is
¼i (b2(vi) = x) =
1 ¡ x
1 ¡ y (vi ¡ x) + 2
x ¡ y
1 ¡ y
µ
vi ¡ x + y2
¶
= vi ¡ x + x ¡ y1 ¡ y (vi ¡ y) < vi ¡ y
for x > y and vi < 1:
Thus, whenever bidder j drops out at y, it is optimal for i to drop out at y as well (unless vi = 1 which
happens with probability 0). Hence in any continuation game that is reached after one bidder drops out,31
the other drops out as well.
Hence, if bidder j drops out at 0 (or if x1 = 0; at a price which is an arbitrarily small amount larger
than 0), bidder i drops out as well and j receives ¼j = vj ¡ 0.
It has been shown in Appendix A.3 that this payo¤ dominates the expected payo¤ in any other equi-
librium. Hence given our assumption of updating after o¤-equilibrium drop-outs, in any equilibrium other
than the DR–equilibrium a bidder can increase his pro…t by deviating from his equilibrium strategy to
dropping out at 0 on one unit (or if x1 = 0; at a price which is an arbitrarily small amount larger than 0).
Hence all Perfect Bayesian equilibria other than the DR–equilibrium break down. For the DR–equilibrium,
in contrast, the beliefs in Appendix A.2 correspond to the condition of strict Bayesian updating.
B Instructions (Ausubel Auction)
Please read these instructions carefully. If there is something you do not understand, please raise your
hand. We will then answer your questions privately. The instructions are identical for all participants.
In the course of the experiment you will participate in 10 auctions. In each auction you and another
bidder will bid for two units of a …ctitious good. This other bidder will be the same in each auction.
31 Note that there are no real subgames, since there is incomplete information about the valuation of the other bidder.
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Each unit that you acquire will be sold to the experimenters for your private resale value v. Before each
auction this value per unit, v, will be randomly drawn independently for each bidder from the interval
0 · v · 100 ECU (Experimental Currency Unit). Any number between 0 and 100 is equally probable. The
private resale values of di¤erent bidders are independent. In each auction any unit that you acquire
will have the same value for you. This value will be drawn anew before each auction.
Before each auction you will be informed about your resale value per unit, v. Each participant will be
informed only about his or her own resale value, but not about the other bidder’s resale value.
After a short break the auction starts:
The price per unit will be increased successively in steps of 1, beginning at a price of 0. At the
beginning of the auction you are active on both units. At any time you can drop out on one unit by
clicking the button “dropout 1” or you can drop out on both units simultaneously by clicking the button
“dropout 2”.
If one of the bidders clicks the button “dropout 2”, the other bidder obtains both units for the price
where the …rst bidder dropped out and the auction is …nished (since then there are only two active bids
left).
If one bidder drops out on one unit, the other immediately obtains one unit (since the …rst bidder has
only one active bid left and can thus acquire at most one unit) for the price at which the …rst bidder
dropped out.
Then the auction continues at the price at which the …rst unit was given away. Now only one unit is
auctioned o¤ and both bidders have only one active bid. If now one bidder drops out on this unit, the
other bidder obtains this unit for the price at which the bidder dropped out and the auction is …nished.
If upon reaching the maximal price of 100 ECU there are four active bids left, both bidders receive one
unit for a price of 100 ECU. If upon reaching the maximal price of 100 ECU there is only one unit given
away, (both bidders still have one active bid), then the other unit will be randomly allocated for a price of
100 ECU among the two bidders.
Your pro…t per unit acquired is your resale value minus the price at which you obtained the unit.
If you do not obtain a unit you neither receive nor pay anything. Hence your pro…t is 0.
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Note that you can make losses as well. It is always possible, however, to bid in such a way that you can
prevent losses for sure.
You will make your decision via the computer terminal. You will not get to know the names and code
numbers of the other participants. Thus all decisions remain con…dential.
One ECU corresponds to 0,04 DM. You will obtain an initial endowment of 5 DM. If you make losses
in an auction these will be deducted from your previous gains (or from your initial endowment). You will
receive your …nal pro…t in cash at the end of the experiment. The other participants will not get to know
your pro…ts.
If there is something you have not understood, please raise your hand. We will then answer your
questions privately.
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Scatter Diagrams, Sealed-Bid Auctions
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Figure 1.2
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Figure 1.6
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Figure 1.3
VA - Unit1 Bids
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Figure 1.4
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Figure 1.5
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Scatter Diagrams - Open Auctions
Figure 2.1
All Dropouts -  AA
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Figure 2.3
All Dropouts - UPO
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Figure 2.2
AA -  Pairs 2,3,7,8,9
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Figure 2.4
UPO - Pairs 3,4,6
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UPoS - All Pairs UPoS - pairs that played close to DR in the open auction
Figure 3.1
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Figure 3.3
UPoS - Unit1 Bids (Pairs 3,4,6)
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Figure 3.4
UPoS - Unit2 Bids (Pairs 3,4,6)
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UPsO - all pairs and pairs that played close to DR UPSo - bids in the preceeding sealed-bid auction by pairs that 
played close to DR in the open auction
Figure 4.1
UPsO
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UPSo (Pairs 3,9)
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UPsO - Pairs 3,9
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Table 3.1             Auctioneer's revenues (Equilibrium Revenue = TT Eq. Revenue in all auctions to make revenues comparable)
UPS VA DA
Pair
TT-Equilibrium 
Revenue (ER)
Revenue 
(R) R - ER (R * 100)/ER Pair
Equilibrium 
Revenue 
(ER)
Revenue 
(R) R - ER (R * 100)/ER Pair
Equilibrium 
Revenue 
(ER)
Revenue 
(R) R - ER (R * 100)/ER
1 488 682 194 139.75 1 614 568 -46 92.51 1 734 879 145 119.75
2 548 486 -62 88.69 2 848 861 13 101.53 2 615 655 40 106.50
3 498 478 -20 95.98 3 550 604 54 109.82 3 700 1017 317 145.29
4 356 572 216 160.67 4 608 252 -356 41.45 4 628 639 11 101.75
5 496 502 6 101.21 5 770 643 -127 83.51 5 714 829 115 116.11
6 618 760 142 122.98 6 520 547 27 105.19 6 687 835 148 121.54
7 760 710 -50 93.42 7 858 829 -29 96.62 7 652 542 -110 83.13
8 498 576 78 115.66 8 576 753 177 130.73 8 571 612 41 107.18
9 546 498 -48 91.21 9 476 444 -32 93.28 9 592 517 -75 87.33
10 502 404 -98 80.48 10 872 895 23 102.64
TOTAL 5893 6525 632 110.72
TOTAL 5310 5668 358 106.74 TOTAL 6692 6396 -296 95.58
UPO AA
Pair
TT-Equilibrium 
Revenue (ER)
Revenue 
(R) R - ER (R * 100)/ER Pair
Equilibrium 
Revenue 
(ER)
Revenue 
(R) R - ER (R * 100)/ER
1 814 584 -230 71.74 1 618 271 -347 43.85
2 562 592 30 105.34 2 518 525 7 101.35
3 654 128 -526 19.57 3 770 723 -47 93.90
4 614 8 -606 1.30 4 638 279 -359 43.73
5 732 740 8 101.09 5 914 630 -284 68.93
6 778 272 -506 34.96 6 892 674 -218 75.56
7 1014 868 -146 85.60 7 600 658 58 109.67
8 546 448 -98 82.05 8 530 562 32 106.04
9 588 634 46 107.82 9 636 613 -23 96.38
10 768 602 -166 78.39 10 804 929 125 115.55
TOTAL 7070 4876 -2194 68.97 TOTAL 6920 5864 -1056 84.74
Table 3.2    Auctioneer's Revenues - UPsO and UPoS Table 4.2      Bidders' Profits - UPsO and UPoS
(Eq. Revenue = TT Eq. Revenue in all auctions to make revenues comparable) (Eq. Profit = DR Eq. Profit)
UPoS UPoS
DR 
Pair
TT-Equilibrium 
Revenue (ER)
Revenue 
(R) R - ER (R * 100)/ER Pair
Equilibrium 
Profit (EP) Profit (P) P - EP (P * 100)/EP
1 594 762 168 128.28 1 962 380 -582 39.50
2 782 672 -110 85.93 2 1007 400 -607 39.72
3 480 180 -300 37.50 3 942 825 -117 87.58
4 646 42 -604 6.50 4 943 1029 86 109.12
5 772 570 -202 73.83 5 1090 647 -443 59.36
6 618 478 -140 77.35 6 1046 795 -251 76.00
7 682 412 -270 60.41 7 989 829 -160 83.82
8 682 776 94 113.78 8 1072 629 -443 58.68
9 540 492 -48 91.11 9 787 540 -247 68.61
10 608 184 -424 30.26 10 1052 951 -101 90.40
TOTAL 6404 4568 -1836 71.33 TOTAL 9890 7025 -2865 71.03
UPsO UPsO
DR
Pair
TT-Equilibrium 
Revenue (ER)
Revenue 
(R) R - ER (R * 100)/ER Pair
Equilibrium 
Profit (EP) Profit (P) P - EP (P * 100)/EP
1 628 500 -128 79.62 1 1075 895 -180 83.26
2 828 654 -174 78.99 2 963 375 -588 38.94
3 474 190 -284 40.08 3 837 758 -79 90.56
4 752 754 2 100.27 4 1154 757 -397 65.60
5 608 438 -170 72.04 5 966 691 -275 71.53
6 928 950 22 102.37 6 1150 402 -748 34.96
7 712 658 -54 92.42 7 984 530 -454 53.86
8 508 464 -44 91.34 8 909 807 -102 88.78
9 738 252 -486 34.15 9 1067 874 -193 81.91
10 478 478 0 100.00 10 958 926 -32 96.66
TOTAL 6654 5338 -1316 80.22 TOTAL 10063 7015 -3048 69.71
Table 4.1          Bidder Profits (Equilibrium Profit = DR Equilibrium Profit in UPO and UPS)
UPS VA DA
Pair
DR-Equilibrium 
Profit (EP) Profit (P) P - EP (P * 100)/EP Pair
Equilibrium 
Profit (EP) Profit (P) P - EP (P * 100)/EP Pair
Equilibrium 
Profit (EP) Profit (P) P - EP (P * 100)/EP
1 969 637 -332 65.74 1 898 941 43 104.79 1 734 553 -181 75.34
2 916 738 -178 80.57 2 564 391 -173 69.33 2 615 545 -70 88.62
3 978 726 -252 74.23 3 584 470 -114 80.48 3 700 329 -371 47.00
4 772 497 -275 64.38 4 514 843 329 164.01 4 628 520 -108 82.80
5 866 734 -132 84.76 5 392 410 18 104.59 5 714 535 -179 74.93
6 1077 682 -395 63.32 6 832 805 -27 96.75 6 687 489 -198 71.18
7 1003 533 -470 53.14 7 484 316 -168 65.29 7 652 737 85 113.04
8 803 409 -394 50.93 8 648 281 -367 43.36 8 571 490 -81 85.81
9 852 548 -304 64.32 9 832 790 -42 94.95 9 592 656 64 110.81
10 826 726 -100 87.89 10 636 555 -81 87.26
TOTAL 5893 4854 -1039 82.37
TOTAL 9062 6230 -2832 68.75 TOTAL 6384 5802 -582 90.88
UPO AA
Pair
DR-Equilibrium 
Profit (EP) Profit (P) P - EP (P * 100)/EP Pair
Equilibrium 
Profit (EP) Profit (P) P - EP (P * 100)/EP
1 1183 617 -566 52.16 1 826 1017 191 123.12
2 898 538 -360 59.91 2 462 453 -9 98.05
3 1011 883 -128 87.34 3 728 767 39 105.36
4 933 954 21 102.25 4 188 543 355 288.83
5 1072 592 -480 55.22 5 458 632 174 137.99
6 1055 783 -272 74.22 6 582 644 62 110.65
7 1168 443 -725 37.93 7 652 592 -60 90.80
8 884 764 -120 86.43 8 1008 976 -32 96.83
9 981 688 -293 70.13 9 922 920 -2 99.78
10 1121 729 -392 65.03 10 540 293 -247 54.26
TOTAL 10306 6991 -3315 67.83 TOTAL 6366 6837 471 107.40
